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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code 
Annotated 19 53, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISS 
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE 
OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF? 
This is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on a 
"correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) . 
II. IS WEST VALLEY CITY ORDINANCE 23-5-102 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD? 
A trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based upon its 
conclusion that the challenged statute is constitutionally valid 
presents a question of law. That decision should be reviewed under 
a correction-of-error standard, granting no particular deference to 
the trial court. West Valley City v. Streetei, 849 P. 2d 613 
(Utah App. 199 3). 
III. WAS POULSEN'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT? 
The denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, should be given deference, and 
should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994) . 
1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
West Valley City Municipal Code: 
23-5-102. Animals Running at Large. 
It shall be unlawful for the owner or person having 
charge, care, custody or control of any animal to allow such 
animal at any time to run at large. The owner or person 
charged with responsibility for an animal found running at 
large shall be strictly liable for a violation of this Section 
regardless of the precautions taken to prevent the escape of 
the animal and regardless of whether or not he knows that the 
animal is running at large. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction in the Third 
Circuit Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for four counts of violating Section 23-5-102 of the West 
Valley City Municipal Code, "Animals Running at Large." 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced by the arrest of Lynn 
Poulsen on or about February 15, 1994. Following her arrest, 
Poulsen filed numerous pretrial motions, including the following: 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide Evidence (Record, p. 21); 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Record, p. 57); Motion 
to Take Deposition with Alternative Recording Device (Record, 
p. 68) ; Motion to Dismiss Ordinance Void and Unconstitutional 
Hearing Requested (Record, p. 7 0) ; Motion for Severance of Charges 
and Counts (Record, p. 74); Motion in Limine (Record, p. 77); 
Motion for Payment of Witness Fees and Research Fees at Public 
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Expense (Record, p. 82); Motion to Disqualify Judge (Record, 
p. 91); Motion to Suppress (Record, p. 109). 
On July 5, 1994, the trial court judge granted Poulsen's 
Motion to Dismiss the six counts of "Nuisance: Animals." The 
trial court denied Poulsen's other motions. 
A jury trial was held on July 5, 1994. Following trial, 
Poulsen filed a Motion for Arrest of Judgment or in the Alternative 
Motion to Vacate Verdict of Guilty and Grant New Trial, and a 
Motion for New Trial. The trial court denied both of Poulsen's 
motions on August 22, 1994. Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal on 
August 30, 1994. 
Subsequent to Poulsen's filing of the Notice of Appeal, she 
filed a Motion for Payment of Transcripts of Court Proceedings for 
Appeal. The trial court denied this Motion on November 4, 1994. 
Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals, 
appealing the trial court's denial of her Motion for Payment of 
Transcripts. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial 
court in its Memorandum Decision dated May 11, 199 5, Case 
No. 940727-CA. The Utah Supreme Court denied Poulsen's Writ of 
Certiorari for review of the Court of Appeals' decision regarding 
the payment of transcripts. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, Poulsen was convicted of four of the six counts 
brought against her of "Animals Running at Large," a class B 
misdemeanor. On August 3, 1994, the trial court judge imposed a 
3 
jail sentence of thirty days, which was suspended; a fine of $750, 
$250 of which was suspended; and ordered that Poulsen could 
complete fifty hours of community service in lieu of the $500 fine 
that was due and owing. The court also placed Poulsen on probation 
for twelve months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on February 15, 1994, West 
Valley City Police Officer Cox responded to a report of horses 
running at large at the approximate location of 2700 South 7000 
West in West Valley City. Transcript, pp. 15-16, 18, 27. 
2. Upon his arrival at the location, Officer Cox observed 
six to eight horses loose on the streets of West Valley City. 
Transcript, pp. 16-17, 20-22. 
3. Officer Cox, in conjunction with several Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputies, followed the horses as they traveled in a 
northwesterly direction. Transcript, pp. 20-22. 
4. Officer Cox momentarily lost contact with the horses as 
they traveled through a field. Transcript, pp. 22, 28. However, 
he again located the animals as they were entering a pasture 
located at approximately 2100 South 7400 West, which is outside the 
border of West Valley City. Transcript, pp. 23-24. Officer Cox 
recognized the horses to the be same horses he had been pursuing in 
West Valley City. Transcript, p. 31. 
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5. When Officer Cox arrived at the pasture, Poulsen was 
present and was directing the horses into the pasture and tying 
them up. Transcript, pp. 24-25. 
6. West Valley City Animal Control Officer Larsen and West 
Valley City Police Officer Prisbrey made contact with Poulsen at 
the pasture. Transcript, pp. 37-38. Poulsen demonstrated a 
familiarity with the pasture by warning the officers that it was 
unsafe to enter it to pursue the horses. Transcript, pp. 70-71. 
Poulsen also demonstrated a familiarity with the horses by warning 
the officers of one horse that had a tendency to kick and another 
horse that was blind. Transcript, p. 72. Poulsen also identified 
the pasture as belonging to her (Transcript, p. 119) and proceeded 
to repair the fence around the pasture (Transcript, pp. 40-41). 
7. Poulsen was accompanied by her daughter (Transcript, 
p. 73) , who had arrived in a separate vehicle (Transcript, p. 108) , 
and who also demonstrated familiarity with the horses by riding one 
bareback, with no halter or reins, to the back of the pasture 
(Transcript, p. 44) and, along with Poulsen, by feeding the horses 
with feed she removed from her vehicle (Transcript, pp. 45-46, 
109). Poulsen initially denied owning the horses, but ultimately 
accepted responsibility for them (Transcript, pp. 107, 120) and 
admitted to Officer Prisbrey that four of the horses were hers 
(Transcript, p. 120) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED 
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF, 
SINCE SUFFICIENT FACTS HAD BEEN PLACED 
INTO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. 
At the conclusion of the City's case in chief, Poulsen moved 
for a dismissal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. She 
argued that the evidence presented to that point did not establish 
a prima facia violation of the "animals running at large'' 
ordinance. The trial court property denied Poulsen's motion. The 
judge recognized that testimony had been presented establishing 
both essential elements of the offense. First, Officer Cox 
testified that the animals, in this case horses, had been seen 
running at large down several streets in West Valley City. Second, 
Officer Larsen testified that Poulsen had helped contain the horses 
in a pasture, had repaired the pasture fence, and had demonstrated 
a familiarity with the horses consistent with her being in charge, 
care, custody, or control of the horses. This familiarity was 
established by Poulsen's knowledge of the horses' characteristics, 
such as their blindness and tendency to kick; the horses' 
willingness to come to her; her daughter's ability to ride one of 
the horses bareback, without halter or reins; and feeding the 
horses. 
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II. SECTION 23-5-102 OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD. 
The language of the ordinance is clear and concise and does 
not sweep otherwise legal conduct into its purview, nor does it 
impinge upon any constitutionally protected conduct. 
The ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad as applied 
to the facts of this case. It was uncontroverted that the horses 
were running at large. It was also uncontroverted that Poulsen 
admitted ownership of four of the horses. These facts fall 
squarely within the conduct prohibited by the ordinance. Poulsen 
does not have standing to argue that the ordinance may be overbroad 
as applied to hypothetical facts or facts not before the court. 
III. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF POULSEN'S ARREST AND 
INCARCERATION, AND THE PROSECUTOR'S 
REMARKS RELATING TO THAT EVIDENCE, WERE 
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT AT 
THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF POULSEN. 
Poulsen's contention that the evidence was improperly admitted 
by the trial court regarding her arrest is a gross 
misrepresentation of the proceedings before the trial court. At a 
prior motion hearing, the City had stipulated not to present 
evidence on this subject. However, at the pretrial argument on 
July 5, 1994, Poulsen specifically requested that the trial court 
allow such evidence. At her request, the previous stipulation and 
order of the court was dissolved, and it was agreed that either 
party could raise the circumstances of the arrest. At trial, 
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Poulsen did not object to this testimony until it appeared to be 
damaging to her. Obviously, Poulsen cannot specifically request 
that the trial court allow such evidence and now claim that its 
admission was improper and that the prosecutor's remarks concerning 
the evidence were inappropriate. 
Also, the circumstances of the arrest were first raised by 
Poulsen in her opening argument. Once she had raised the issue 
before the jury and had described the conduct of the arresting 
officers as "unreasonable and irrational," the City was entitled to 
present evidence to establish the reason that Poulsen was taken 
into custody. 
Finally, the remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument 
were fair characterizations of the evidence that had been properly 
admitted, including evidence of deceptive and inconsistent 
statements by Poulsen. 
IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING STRICT 
LIABILITY AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
OF "ANIMALS RUNNING AT LARGE" ACCURATELY 
REFLECT THE LAW. 
The jury instruction regarding strict liability is an accurate 
presentation of the law. This instruction was appropriate since 
the plain language of the ordinance makes it a strict liability 
offense. 
The jury instruction regarding the elements of the crime of 
"animals running at large" is an accurate description of the 
elements of the crime that the City was required to prove. The 
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instruction was appropriate for this case and was properly 
presented to the jury. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE PROPERLY DENIED 
POULSEN'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE CITY'S CASE IN CHIEF, 
SINCE SUFFICIENT FACTS HAD BEEN PLACED 
INTO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. 
At the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief, Poulsen 
moved for a dismissal of the charges against her on the basis that 
the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case against her. Transcript, p. 79. Following 
argument, the trial court judge correctly denied Poulsen's motion. 
Transcript, p. 90. 
The uncontroverted evidence before the court at that time 
included the following facts: 
1. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Cox of the West 
Valley City Police Department observed six to eight horses running 
loose at approximately 2700 South 7000 West in West Valley City. 
Transcript, pp. 15-16. 
2. Officer Cox testified that he momentarily lost contact 
with the horses while chasing them in conjunction with several Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Deputies. Transcript, pp. 22, 28. However, 
Officer Cox did locate the animals as they were entering a pasture 
located slightly outside the City border. Transcript, p. 23. 
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Officer Cox further testified that he recognized the horses to be 
the same animals he had been following. Transcript, p. 31. 
3. Officer Cox also testified that Poulsen was present at 
the pasture, assisting in directing the horses into a fenced area. 
Transcript, pp. 24-25. 
4. West Valley City Animal Control Officer Stan Larsen 
testified that when he arrived at the pasture, Poulsen was in the 
process of directing the horses into the pasture area and repairing 
the fence. Transcript, pp. 38, 40-41. 
5. Officer Larsen testified that he had a conversation with 
Poulsen in which she stated that she was not the owner of the 
horses, but that she knew who was. When Officer Larsen questioned 
Poulsen about the identity of the owner, Poulsen responded with a 
name that was unintelligible to him. Transcript, pp. 42, 66. When 
Officer Larsen asked Poulsen to repeat the name, she refused. 
Transcript, p. 66. During their conversation, Poulsen warned 
Larsen that one of the horses had a tendency to kick and another 
was blind in one eye, thereby establishing her familiarity with the 
horses. Transcript, pp. 41, 72. Poulsen also warned Larsen that 
it was dangerous to go into the pasture area. Transcript, pp. 70-
71. 
6. Officer Larsen testified that Poulsen's daughter had 
arrived at the scene by separate vehicle. Transcript, p. 43. He 
observed her jump onto the back of one of the horses and ride it 
bareback, with no halter or reins, to the rear of the pasture, and 
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then observed her unloading food for the horses from her vehicle. 
Transcript, pp. 44-45. 
7 . Officer Larsen also testified that he had consulted with 
a Utah State Brand Inspector, and that following that conversation, 
he did not continue to look for the owner of the horses. 
Transcript, p. 77. The clear implication of Officer Larsen's 
testimony was that he was satisfied that Poulsen was the owner of 
the horses. This was later confirmed by the testimony of Officer 
Prisbrey of the West Valley City Police Department. Transcript, 
pp. 107, 120. 
Based on the facts, which clearly established that the horses 
were running at large within the boundaries of West Valley City and 
that Poulsen was in a position of either being the owner of the 
horses or being the person having charge, care, custody, or control 
of the horses, the judge properly denied her motion. It was not 
necessary for the City to prove a mental element to the crime, 
since the City's "animals running at large" ordinance is a strict 
liability offense. 
Following the judge's denial of Poulsen's motion, additional 
critical evidence was presented during Poulsen's case in chief that 
clearly supported the jury's verdict. Of particular note, Officer 
Prisbrey, a defense witness, testified that Poulsen admitted to him 
that she was responsible for the horses, and then later admitted 
that she was the owner of four of the horses. Transcript, pp. 107, 
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120. None of this evidence was rebutted or challenged by the 
defense, and, ultimately, was the only evidence before the jury. 
II. SECTION 23-5-102 OF THE WEST VALLEY CITY 
MUNICIPAL CODE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
OVERBROAD. 
Section 23-5-102 of the West Valley City Municipal Code is 
clearly not overbroad, since it does not prohibit constitutionally 
protected activity while prohibiting unprotected behavior. State 
v. Frampton, 7 37 P.2d 183 (Utah 19 87). The ordinance applies only 
to those limited circumstances defined by its elements and does not 
sweep innocent conduct into a criminal act. 
The ownership or charge, care, custody, or control of an 
animal is not prohibited. It is only when the ownership or charge, 
care, custody, or control qualities are combined with the 
circumstance of the animal's running at large that a criminal act 
occurs. 
In this case, Poulsen's argument that the language of the 
ordinance may criminalize innocent conduct has no standing. A 
person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot 
challenge the statute on the grounds that it conceivably may be 
applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the 
court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610; 93 S. Ct. 2908; 
37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 839 (1973). This ordinance is not overbroad as 
it related to the facts of this case. Officer Prisbrey testified 
that Poulsen admitted to him that she was the owner of four of the 
horses. That testimony was completely uncontrover ted. Officer 
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Cox, also in testimony that was wholly uncontroverted, testified 
that those same animals were personally observed by him to be 
running loose in West Valley City. Given those facts, the plain 
language of Section 23-5-102 is not unconstitutionally broad as 
applied to Poulsen. She was the owner of four animals that had 
been observed running at large and, therefore, was found guilty of 
four of the six counts brought against her. Also, Poulsen has 
articulated no basis for believing that allowing an animal to run 
at large is a constitutionally protected activity. 
The plain language of the statute does not punish or prohibit 
the conduct of parties that falls outside of the specific 
prohibitions of the ordinance as set forth in its elements. The 
language of the ordinance at issue is clear and unambiguous. It 
simply prohibits a person who is in ownership or control of an 
animal to let the animal run at large. Poulsen has not shown that 
the ordinance is overbroad on its face, in its application to her, 
or that it impinges on a constitutionally protected right. 
III. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF POULSEN'S ARREST AND 
INCARCERATION, AND THE PROSECUTOR'S 
REMARKS RELATING TO THAT EVIDENCE, WERE 
PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT AT 
THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF POULSEN. 
Poulsen complains that trial court improperly allowed the 
evidence presented by the prosecution relative to her arrest and 
subsequent incarceration. She further asserts that the 
prosecutor's reference to that evidence in closing argument was 
13 
improper. This argument is based upon a gross misrepresentation of 
the proceedings before the trial court. 
At a prior hearing, the City had stipulated not to present 
evidence regarding the reasons that Poulsen was arrested rather 
than merely issued a citation. However, at the pretrial argument 
on July 5, 1994, Poulsen specifically requested that the trial 
court allow such evidence. At her request, the previous 
stipulation and order of the court was dissolved, and the court 
stated: 
Court: That order is stricken based on your 
statements to the Court that you want to 
be free to raise the issue, if this is 
what you choose and you are not objecting 
to the prosecutor raising the issue as 
well. 
We will proceed on that basis. 
Poulsen: Thank you, your Honor. 
Record, p. 295 (emphasis added). 
A copy of the relevant sections of the Record, pages 290-295, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
At trial, Poulsen did not object to testimony about the arrest 
until the discrepancies in her statements about having a driver's 
license appeared to be damaging to her. Obviously, Poulsen cannot 
specifically request that the trial court allow evidence regarding 
the arrest and then selectively exclude that which she does not 
wish the jury to hear. Furthermore, she obviously cannot request 
that the evidence be allowed and now claim, before this Court, that 
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its admission was improper and that the prosecutor's remarks 
concerning the evidence were inappropriate. 
Even at trial, the circumstances regarding Poulsen's arrest 
were initially raised by Poulsen herself. In her opening argument, 
Poulsen stated: 
. . . these officers acted in an unreasonable 
and un-- irrational [sic] manner, and that all 
they cared about that night was simply that 
they got someone, just anyone. 
As a matter of fact, I've been told I was the 
only one that has ever been arrested and taken 
into custody for this offense. 
Transcript, p. 10. 
Poulsen also stated in her opening, "This little boy lost his 
mother for 22 hours while she sat in jail." Transcript, p. 12. 
Having raised the issue before the jury that her arrest was 
unique or unusual, and having alleged that the police officers who 
arrested her acted unreasonably and irrationally, the City, in 
reliance upon the pretrial argument agreement, was entitled to 
provide an explanation of the reasons for the arrest. The City's 
explanation was presented by way of direct examination of Animal 
Control Officer Larsen. Officer Larsen testified that it was his 
intention to issue Poulsen a citation and to release her at the 
scene. Transcript, p. 52. However, Poulsen was unable to produce 
identification, refused to give her date of birth, and provided the 
officer with two addresses. Officer Larsen testified that Poulsen 
originally stated she had apparently lost her driver's license and 
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that she began to search for it in the pasture, using a flashlight. 
He further testified that a check by radio revealed that Poulsen in 
fact did not have a driver's license. Transcript, pp. 49-52. 
Based upon Poulsen's lack of cooperation with regard to the 
information needed for the citation, Officer Prisbrey eventually 
placed her under arrest. In a situation such as this, the officer 
has little choice but to choose arrest rather than citation. When 
an officer issues a citation to an individual whose identity he is 
unsure of, there is a great risk that the citation is being issued 
in the wrong name and that, subsequently, the offender cannot be 
found or will not appear in court. In addition, in this case the 
officer believed Poulsen to be deceptive regarding her driver's 
license. She first claimed to have one, apparently did not, and 
then became evasive when further questioned. Transcript, pp. 99-
100. The only way to assure Poulsen's appearance on the charges 
was to take her into custody. The prosecution presented these 
facts in order to rebut the allegations raised by Poulsen in her 
opening statement that the officers had acted unreasonably and 
irrationally, and that the arrest had been unusual. 
Following the prosecution's brief presentation (Transcript, 
pp. 49-52), and consistent with her pretrial argument statement 
that "I think that it is going to greatly help my case in showing 
that these officers acted terribly unreasonable . . . " (Record, 
p. 294), Poulsen seemed fascinated with the subject of her arrest. 
She repeatedly questioned Officer Larsen on cross-examination 
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regarding the circumstances of her arrest, and also raised the 
issue in her direct examination of Officer Prisbrey, who she called 
as a defense witness. Poulsen seemed much more interested in 
delving into the reasons for her arrest than in presenting evidence 
regarding the "animals running at large" charges. At one point 
during her direct examination of Officer Prisbrey, the City finally 
felt compelled to object to the line of testimony. This occurred 
during the following exchange: 
Q (POULSEN) Now, Officer Larsen said that 
he was going to issue a 
citation? 
A (PRISBREY) Yes. 
Q And I gave him my name? 
A You gave him a name, yes. 
Q And I gave him an address? 
A You gave him two addresses. 
Q And I gave him a phone number? 
A You did. 
Q And there's only two things 
that I wouldn't give him; is 
that correct? 
A I wouldn't know how to answer 
that question. I'm sorry. 
Q I did give him a phone number? 
A Yes. You did. 
Q Now, are you able to check an 
address out by a phone number? 
A Uh huh. In most cases. 
Q And so you have that available 
to you? 
A In most cases. 
MR STONEY: Your Honor, may I ask what the 
relevance is of all of this? What 
does it have to do with horses 
running at large? 
MS. POULSEN: Establishing foundation of 
truthfulness. 
COURT: All right. Proceed. 
Transcript, pp. 97-98. 
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A close reading of the Transcript reveals that by far, the 
bulk of the evidence presented regarding the circumstances of 
Poulsen's arrest were presented by Poulsen herself. Transcript, 
pp. 54-63, 66-67, 73-77, 93-105, 114-118. 
At closing argument, the prosecutor made several references to 
Poulsen's deceptiveness. These references were based in part upon 
Poulsen's statements concerning her driver's license, where she had 
first claimed to have a driver's license, which claim later proved 
to be false. But, there was other independent evidence presented 
that indicated contradicting statements by Poulsen and that support 
the prosecutor's remarks. These statements include Poulsen's 
assertion to Officer Larsen that she was not the owner of the 
horses and her later admission to Officer Prisbrey that she was in 
fact the owner of four of the horses. Also, Officer Larsen 
testified he felt that Poulsen was being deceptive when she 
provided him with the alleged name of the owner of the horses. He 
stated that she said the name quickly and unintelligibly and would 
not repeat it for him. 
Finally, Poulsen's own witness, Officer Prisbrey, testified he 
felt that Poulsen was being deceptive. The Transcript reveals the 
following: 
Q (POULSEN) And up to that point, did you 
have reason to not believe me? 
A (PRISBREY) Relative to what? 
Q Relative to the fact that I 
gave to you my name, I gave you 
an address, reasonable 
explanation and a phone number. 
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A Okay. But to believe or 
disbelieve you relative to 
what? 
Q What would make you think I 
hadn't given you the correct 
information? 
A You--in my mind, I felt that 
you were being deceptive. 
Q In what way? 
A When I asked you for your 
driver's license and 
identification, initially you 
said that you must have dropped 
it somewhere in the pasture. 
You borrowed my flashlight, you 
spent approximately ten minutes 
looking for it. 
When we attempted to have 
dispatch locate a driver's 
license for you, they were 
unable to do so under the name 
that you gave me. At which 
point, I asked you if you had a 
driver's license, you said, 
well, I didn't say I had a Utah 
driver's license. I asked you 
if you had a driver's license 
anywhere in America, you would 
not answer that. 
I felt that you were deceptive 
about your identification. 
Q Do you believe I'm Lynn 
Poulsen? 
A I honestly don't know who you 
are. To this day, I don't know 
who you are. 
Transcript, pp. 99-100. 
Poulsen specifically requested that the trial judge reverse 
the previous order that had been based upon the parties' 
stipulation, and then proceeded to raise the circumstances 
surrounding her arrest in her opening statement to the jury. In 
response, the City provided testimony regarding the reasons why 
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Poulsen was arrested, taken into custody, and incarcerated. 
Following the City's initial explanation, the bulk of the testimony 
concerning the circumstances of the arrest, including the issues 
related to the driver's license, was elicited by Poulsen both 
through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and direct 
examination of her own witnesses. Having initially raised the 
issue and having presented the bulk of the evidence on this issue, 
Poulsen cannot now claim that such evidence was improperly admitted 
by the trial court. Further, the prosecutor's remarks in closing 
argument, which consisted of pointing out the inconsistencies in 
Poulsen's statements, were entirely proper, and Poulsen did not 
object to such statements at trial. 
IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING STRICT 
LIABILITY AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME 
OF "ANIMALS RUNNING AT LARGE" ACCURATELY 
REFLECT THE LAW. 
The record reveals no objection to the jury instructions as 
they were read to the jury. However, Poulsen now raises an issue 
with regard to jury instructions #15 and #16, and claims that they 
misstate the law. 
Jury instruction #15 accurately states the elements of the 
crime that must be found by the jury in order to convict Poulsen. 
These elements, as set forth in jury instruction #15, state: 
(1) That on or about the 15 th day of 
February, 1994; 
(2) In West Valley City; 
(3) The defendant, Lynn Poulsen; 
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(4) Had charge, care, custody or control of 
any animal and allowed such animal to run 
at large. 
Transcript, p. 152. 
Jury instruction #15 accurately describes the elements of 
Section 23-5-102, West Valley City Municipal Code. The City 
carried the burden of proof that on the specified date, in West 
Valley City, animals within the charge, care, custody, or control 
of Lynn Poulsen were running at large. The evidence at trial, 
including the testimony by Officer Prisbrey that Poulsen admitted 
ownership of four of the animals, adequately supported the jury's 
finding of guilt on four of the six charges. 
Jury instruction #16 explains the concept of strict liability 
to the jury. Since Section 23-5-102, West Valley City Municipal 
Code, states clearly on its face that it is a strict liability 
offense, as required by Section 76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated, this 
instruction is entirely appropriate, and Poulsen's arguments 
otherwise are without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that 
Poulsen's appeal be denied, and that the convictions be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 1996. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
WO Mr 
J.\jRichard Catten, Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Record, pp. 290-295 
11 determine the location of the animals' owner, the county will determine the 
2 ownership. 
3 If they are unable to locate the ownership within a reasonable time, then it can 
4 be disposed of. 
5 The whole time, it refers to the county. Under the municipal code 
6 construction, it states that the code will be strictly construed and that county means 
7 Salt Lake County. 
8 Therefore, your Honor, I would move the dismiss on the fact that I don't think 
9 the city has the right to prosecute this. 
10 I know it's been brought to the attention of this Court before. I want this on 
11 record so that everybody is well aware that everything states that there must a contract 
12 with the city. Contract means that there is a written agreement. 
13 To my knowledge, there is none. 
14 I have requested it, and there isn't any. You might say, every single bit of 
15 information that I have gleaned throughout the whole state code, states that it will be 
16 the "county's duty and not the city's." I would move to dismiss this on that. If the 
17 county wishes to prosecute me, they can, ... they know where I live. 
18 Court: Well, as you state, this has already been before the Court. I am going 
19 to stand on the decision to dismiss, to deny the move to dismiss on the basis that you 
20 raise. I am also going to not demand an order and stipulation as to the definition of 
21 the terms charge, care, custody or control as you have suggested. I believe that the 
22 language in the statute is plain and should be understandable and I think, frankly, by 
23 attempting to integrate the different meaning would more likely confuse the jury than 
24 to assist the jury and so we will not require the stipulation. Are we prepared to go 
25 forward? 
26 Poulsen: I have one more matter before the Court. It also states that the city 
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11 shall state that the duties of the pound keeper are. I have called the city and have 
2 asked for the duties of the pound keeper and they gave me a copy of their codes ... 
3 which was very old ... and in there ... I found no authority for arrest. 
4 In further talking with, ... being taken into custody, ... and further talking with 
5 Barbara Carr, she stated that she had never known of a person who was arrested. My 
6 question goes to, ... if it is not within the duties of the pound keeper to cite a person 
7 outside of their city, then was the arrest lawful and the custody taken and I would ask 
8 for a determination of that. 
9 I believe that I have asserted standing and I believe that there is questionable 
10 facts before the Court that it states that it will ... state his duties within the city's 
11 boundaries. 
12 I realize that this is probably like, I don't know, a citizen's arrest or something, 
13 but the police officer's report clearly states that it did it under direction of ... the 
14 arrest under the direction of the pound keeper. 
15 If that is correct, and it was done under this authority, then I would like to see 
16 what the duties of the pound keeper are and if they would indeed have the duty to 
17 have somebody take me into custody for animals at large. 
18 The officer gave conclusive testimony, he stated, on the stand, "you were 
19 arrested for not cooperating with the police officer and for failing to have 
20 identification." 
21 I haven't been charged with either one of those. I have been charged with 
22 "Animals at Large." I would like the determination as to the validity of the arrest that 
23 was made and if it was proper and pursuant to the fact that under the reasonable 
24 suspicion statute, it states an officer may ask for your name, address, and an 
25 explanation. 
26 It also states that he can ... that he hadn't had reason to believe that I would 
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11 flee or destroy evidence, injury another person. 
2 It also states here that ... I also told him and he states in this report, that I told 
3 him I was born again. 
4 It also states that I gave him all truthful information because they certainly are 
5 not citing me with false information. 
6 The fact of the matter is, ... I wonder if the officer, ... if the animal control 
7 officer, indeed had the right to have me arrested for that charge, or just release me on 
8 the citation and also if the officer had the right to make the arrest when I had given 
9 him all the information that was authorized by statute? 
10 Court: Is this a matter that has been before the Court previously or are you 
11 just raising it for the first time? 
12 Poulsen: No, your Honor. This ... I started to bring this up and the reason 
13 why is because of probably cause because several times I've mentioned that I stated 
14 that I was arrested on that, I wasn't just cited. I was arrested. It seems to me that I 
15 have a certain standing to have the determination of their arrest brought before the 
16 Court and if there is not validity to the fact that I was arrested, then a determination 
17 of if it was a false arrest. 
18 I am wondering, ... and I am sure the Court must wonder also, where it says to 
19 prescribe this duties, if indeed an animal control officer has the right and duty to have 
20 a person arrested. 
21 Or, is he just given the authority to cite a person and release them on citation. 
22 Court: Is this going to be an issue, Mr. Stoney, to be brought before the jury 
23 today? 
24 Stoney: The arrest, your Honor? 
25 Court: Yes. 
26 Stoney: I don't know that it has anything to do with anything we are talking 
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11 about today. 
2 Court: Well, what's troubling me is we are holding a jury, this is not 
3 something that has been filed timely, whether you have an independent basis to have 
4 standing for false arrest or not. 
5 Fin not going to cite, off the top of my head, without giving both yourself and 
6 the city a chance to brief it. 
7 But it seems to me that it is not something that we are going to be taking up in 
8 this jury trial. What I am going to do is suggest that you reserve that argument. 
9 Certainly I am not going to prejudice you from making it, but, try not to entertain it 
10 this morning without having any notice to the Court previously and delay the jury 
11 from getting on with this case. 
12 Stoney: I understood, your Honor, that I was under an order not to talk about 
13 the fact that she was taken into custody. 
14 Court: That's my understanding of the order that was entered the last time we 
15 were here and I think that's where I want this to stand. 
16 Poulsen: Your Honor, there were timely objections filed for this, but they have 
17 never been addressed by the Court. 
18 I thought this was a substantial issue. 
19 I was not the one who made that motion. The city didn't even put in a motion 
20 to not have the arrest brought up. The Court just simply granted the city's request. 
21 They have never filed a motion whatsoever before this Court, they just simply were 
22 granted the request. 
23 Court: You made a motion for in limine ... 
24 Poulsen: Simply on the fact that a refusal to get a birth|pte is not required by 
25 any ordinance or a statue, ... required under the law, ... that was all. 
26 Stoney: You want to be mentioned then? I understood at the hearing that the 
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11 city was attempting to accommodate you and discussing with the Court what they were 
2 prepared not to mention to avoid prejudicing you. That was my understanding that 
3 was happening. 
4 Poulsen: Your Honor, all I ask was that the fact that my birthrate, that I 
5 refused to give my birthrate to the officers because it was religious belief and then I 
6 would have to explain my religious belief and right to assert my birthrate to them. 
7 The city is the one who misrepresented that to the Court and stated, "Oh, I 
8 think she is just a little upset about being taken into custody and we won't bring that 
9 up." 
10 I think that it is going to gready help my case in showing that these officers 
11 acted terribly unreasonable and under the circumstances, that I was the only person 
12 that West Valley can think of that has been arrested for Animals at Large. 
13 Also, this is the basis of my motion to suppress. These officers, they were 
14 threatening and coercive, there was a lot of reasons why there should be a motion to 
15 suppress the presents of numerous officers. 
16 I presented Utah law and the strict fact that they have certain requirements, I 
17 need to bring all these up before I go to trial even though I may have addressed them 
18 before. It is my understanding, according to Justice Zimmerman. I am bringing this 
19 up because I believe it is a valid issue. 
20 I have the duties of animal control and there is nothing in there that says that 
21 they can arrest. I was arrested. I think I have an asserted standing through my 
22 objections, that have not been addressed. 
23 Stoney: If she wants to make the motion at the appropriate time in the trial and 
24 then make an argument, I don't have an objection to that and I will be happy to go 
25 ahead and mention the fact that she was arrested to the jury so that we can get on with 
26 this today. 
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1J Court: Would that satisfy you? 
2 Poulsen: Is that a fact then that whether the animal officer had a right to 
3 arrest? 
4 Stoney: You can bring that up at the appropriate time, Lynn. That's what I'm 
5 saying. 
6 Poulsen: Maybe I don't the appropriate time, being pro se. 
7 Stoney: Unfortunately for you, it is not the Court's job or my job to tell you 
8 that. 
9 Poulsen: So, I can assert that and raise a question for the jury to decide? 
10 Court: What you can raise is your defense subject to the objections of Mr. 
11 Stoney, the prosecutor, just as if you can object to his case and I will rule under 
12 relevancy at the time. 
13 I am not going to pre-judge the issue at this point to the extent that there was 
14 an order in place that that was not to be mentioned. 
15 That order is stricken based on your statements to the Court that you want to be 
16 free to raise the issue, if this is what you choose and you are not objecting to the 
17 prosecutor raising the issue as well. 
18 We will proceed on that basis. 
19 Poulsen: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 Court: Are we ready to .... I wanted to make a statement on record that aspect 
21 of this. 
22 There was a motion to disqualify this trial, the proceeding of the Court, which 
23 by the rules that allows the judge to review that if the Court doesn't believe that there 
24 is a prejudice which exists and that process was completed from Judge Thome, ... he 
25 denied the motion. There were some representations made in the affidavit as to 
26 comments that Mr. Stoney made to Ms. Poulsen about my views about her on the 
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